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Latin America and the Liberal International Order: An Agenda for Research 
Introduction 
International Relations has been consumed by debates over the future of the ‘liberal 
international order’ (LIO). The LIO’s norms and institutions, associated with US leadership, 
appear to be threatened from without by the rise of authoritarian powers like China and 
corroded from within by the likes of US President Donald Trump and a rising tide of anti-
European Union politicians and voters.1 Concern about the current crisis has been 
complemented with greater attention to the order’s origins and evolution to unearth lessons 
about how LIO might be adapted to changing conditions.2 More critically, scholars have 
uncovered how imperial practices and power disparities have been central to LIO.  
Despite the LIO debate’s expansive parameters—historical and contemporary, supportive and 
critical—Latin America has been largely absent from the multitude of studies of LIO, also 
often called the American world order, global liberal order, or the US-led liberal world order. 
For example, a recent special issue of International Affairs on ‘Liberal Internationalism in 
Theory and Practice’, edited by G. John Ikenberry and representing a spectrum of 
perspectives on LIO, mentioned Latin America only twice, and quite offhandedly. This is not 
an aberration; the lack of attention pertains across the spectrum of Anglo-American IR 
scholarship that deals most centrally with the topic. This empirical gap also has consequences 
for our understanding of LIO. The absence of Latin America3 as an object of study in the LIO 
debate, and the minimal consideration of Latin American states as actors who have shaped 
international order, contributes to theoretical blind spots in both critical and supportive IR 
scholarship and public debate on LIO. For critics who have emphasized the imperialist and 
colonial roots of LIO,4 the experience of Latin American states over two centuries—
independent but often internationally unequal—offers a rich vein of experiences of partial 
inclusion or marginalization from LIO.5 For supporters who argue for reforming LIO to save 
                                                          
1 Constance Duncombe and Tim Dunne, ‘After liberal world order’, International Affairs 94: 1, January 2018, 
pp. 25–42. 
2 G. John Ikenberry, Liberal leviathan: the origins, crisis, and transformation of the American world order 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), chap. 5. 
3 ‘Latin America’ is a necessary shorthand, though it obscures much diversity in how countries and subregions 
engaged with and were affected by international factors. 
4 Inderjeet Parmar, ‘The US-led liberal order: imperialism by another name?’, International Affairs 94: 1, 
January 2018, pp. 151–72; Beate Jahn, ‘Liberal internationalism: historical trajectory and current prospects’, 
International Affairs 94: 1, January 2018, pp. 43–61. 
5 The historian Greg Grandin argues against equating US-Latin American relations with ‘other comparable 
hegemon-periphery relations’. Grandin, ‘The liberal traditions in the Americas: rights, sovereignty, and the 
origins of liberal multilateralism’, The American Historical Review 117: 1, February 2012, pp. 68–91 
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it, such as Ikenberry, Latin American experiences could elucidate core weaknesses 
exacerbated by the order’s global expansion.  
LIO has shaped Latin America, and Latin America has shaped LIO—but not always in the 
ways supporters or critics might expect. At first blush, Latin America appears to be a poster 
child for the successes of LIO: the region has long (if distinct and uneven) liberal roots;6 it 
rapidly democratized at the end of the Cold War; and it includes many expansive free traders. 
The region’s diplomatic traditions prize international law, peaceful settlement of disputes, 
and international organization. Reaching back to the 1860s, Latin American jurists have made 
prominent contributions to international jurisprudence, the ‘mortar’ that binds international 
order.7 Its diplomats have played crucial roles in international organizations, as discussed 
below. However, in other ways, LIO historically has been, and remains, superficial in its 
reach in Latin America. The region has had only partial success in pursuing its goals through 
LIO. Domestically, liberal roots are balanced by authoritarianism; formal democracy is 
hobbled by poor governance; external openness is paired with monopolies and corruption; 
and regional international organizations have weak competences despite their proliferation.8 
Even as Latin Americans often claimed a place in Western, liberal international society, 
leading powers relegated the region to a secondary status. 
This article has two primary goals. The first is to show how Latin America largely has been 
overlooked in the primarily Anglo-American, International Relations debate on LIO. The 
second is to illustrate why this omission matters for our understanding of LIO’s evolution and 
effects. Latin America’s omission emerges from two features of the LIO debate. Supportive 
scholars have largely explored why great powers choose to build order and how that order 
shapes relations between these large states. In these accounts, Latin America is placed within 
the US sphere of influence and, therefore, is of little inherent interest. On the other hand, 
                                                          
6 Grandin, ‘The Liberal Traditions in the Americas’, pp. 74-75. See also Ivan Jaksic and Eduardo Posada Carbó, 
eds., Liberalismo y poder: Latinoamérica en el siglo XIX (Santiago: FCE, 2011). Regarding liberalism and its 
critics in Brazil, see João M.E. Maia and Matthew M. Taylor, ‘The Brazilian liberal tradition and the global 
liberal order’, in Oliver Stuenkel and Matthew M. Taylor, eds., Brazil on the global stage: power, ideas, and the 
liberal international order (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). 
7 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for the phrase. Argentine jurist Carlos Calvo published Le Droit 
International Théorique et Pratique in Paris starting in 1863. Major Latin American contributions from the late 
19th and early 20th centuries relate to (non)intervention, arbitration and jurisdiction in international disputes 
(especially of debt and investment), and territorial limits. Arnulf Becker Lorca, ‘International law in Latin 
America or Latin American international law: rise, fall, and retrieval of a tradition of legal thinking and political 
imagination’, Harvard International Law Journal 47: 1, Winter 2006, pp. 283-305. 
8 See Julia Gray, ‘Life, death, or zombie? the vitality of international organizations’, International Studies 
Quarterly 62: 1, March 2018, pp. 1–13; Andrés Malamud and Gian Luca Gardini, ‘Has regionalism peaked? 
The Latin American quagmire and its lessons’, The International Spectator 47: 1, April 2012, pp. 116–33. 
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critical accounts have focused on LIO’s historical links to colonialism. Non-great powers are 
foregrounded, but these are often colonies or decolonizing states. In short, Latin American 
experiences do not fit neatly into supportive or critical accounts. Placing Latin America at the 
heart of studies of LIO requires rethinking key aspects of the debate. Since much of the 
region gained independence in the 1820s, Latin American statehoods evolved in conjunction 
with LIO. Latin America’s international role needs to be connected to broader questions of 
‘ownership’ of LIO beyond the United States and Britain.  
In the following section, we assess the role of Latin America in the primarily Anglo-
American literature on LIO. Finding that the region has been of marginal importance to that 
debate, we offer a macro-historical sketch of Latin America’s engagement in LIO’s formative 
‘critical junctures’.9 Our goal is not to establish an overarching causal explanation of how 
Latin America shaped LIO or how LIO shaped Latin America—an enormous and probably 
impossible task. Instead, this brief history highlights spaces for empirical and theoretical 
contributions to the LIO debate about how the evolving international order interacted with 
regions at its margins. For IR theory on LIO, deeper study of Latin America’s experience 
should cast light on the ways in which non-great powers outside the order’s core shaped, and 
were shaped by, the elements of this order for more than a century.   
Overlooked: Latin America in the LIO debate 
Before assessing how LIO has variably included and excluded Latin America, we first survey 
how academic research on LIO, both supportive and critical, has treated the region. We have 
surveyed recent, prominent works of IR scholarship focused on liberal international order, 
liberal world order, US-led world order, American world order, or some variant, with an 
emphasis on the English-language literature where LIO has been a major concern.  
This is not, of course, terra nullius. There is a great deal of relevant work regarding (and 
from) Latin America, but it mostly has been unexplored in IR’s core debates about LIO. 
Important studies discuss the Latin American role in international law and human rights 
norms, international political economy, and regional and international organizations. 
However, these studies, often in neighbouring disciplines to IR, have had little influence on 
the core IR narratives about LIO’s formation. Likewise, scholars in diverse fields have 
explored the effects of international financial institutions, globalization, and neoliberalism on 
                                                          
9 Giovanni Capoccia and R. Daniel Kelemen, ‘The study of critical junctures: Theory, narrative, and 
counterfactuals in historical institutionalism’, World Politics 59:3, April 2007, pp. 341-369. 
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Latin America, but this is rarely viewed in terms of LIO.10 Economic histories have examined 
how international markets shaped Latin American development, but the particular notion of 
LIO merits little discussion.11 Many international political aspects of Latin America’s 
relationship with LIO have been subsumed by studies of US-Latin American relations; 
however, these are not coterminous. Finally, given the emphasis here on the English-
language debate, it is important to note that Latin American scholars have extensively 
debated (often in Spanish and Portuguese) relevant issues in somewhat different terms: US 
power in inter-American relations; the effects of neoliberalism and democracy promotion; 
and the region’s place in global political and economic structures.12 Especially in Brazil, 
Latin American IR scholars have sometimes tackled LIO directly,13 but this work has rarely 
informed the Anglo-American LIO debate.14  
The following review groups work on LIO into the broad camps of supporters, critics, and 
regionalists, with a focus on emblematic authors within each perspective. These groupings 
necessarily elide some of the nuance present in the work; even key supporters often advocate 
reforming LIO and related aspects of US foreign policy. However, the goal is less a 
comprehensive coverage of the LIO debate than a discussion of Latin America’s role in it. 
With few exceptions, such as the rise of Brazil from 2006-2012, Latin America is 
tangential.15 
                                                          
10 For example, the effects of globalization and neoliberalism on Latin America. Arie M. Kacowicz, 
Globalization and the distribution of wealth: The Latin American experience, 1982-2008 (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013); Laura Macdonald and Arne Ruckert, Post-neoliberalism in the Americas 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). 
11 John H. Coatsworth and Alan M. Taylor, Latin America and the world economy since 1800 (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1998); Rosemary Thorp, Progress, poverty and exclusion: an economic history of 
Latin America in the 20th century (Washington, DC: IDB, 1998); Victor Bulmer-Thomas, The economic history 
of Latin America since independence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
12 For introductions to Latin American debates, see Amado Luiz Cervo, ‘Sob o signo neoliberal: as relações 
internacionais da América Latina’, Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 43: 2, July/December 2000, pp. 
5-27; Carlos Escudé, Realismo periférico: fundamentos para la nueva política exterior argentina (Buenos 
Aires: Planeta, 1992); Antônio Carlos Lessa, ‘Instituições, atores e dinâmicas do ensino e da pesquisa em 
Relações Internacionais no Brasil’, Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 48: 2, December 2005. In 
English, see Arlene B. Tickner, ‘Hearing Latin American voices in International Relations studies’, 
International Studies Perspectives 4:4, November 2003, pp. 325–350. 
13 Celso Lafer, Paradoxos e possibilidades: estudos sobre a ordem mundial e sobre a política exterior do Brasil 
num sistema internacional em transformação (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Nova Fronteira, 1982); Sebastião C. 
Velasco Cruz, ‘Entre normas e fatos: desafios e dilemas da ordem internacional’, Lua Nova 58, 2003, pp. 169-
191; Valérie de Campos Mello. ‘Globalização, regionalismo e ordem internacional’, Revista Brasileira de 
Política Internacional 42: 1, June 1999, pp. 157-181; José María Gómez and Marie-Claude Smouts, América 
Latina y el (des) orden global neoliberal: hegemonía, contrahegemonía, perspectivas (Buenos Aires: CLACSO, 
2004). 
14 For an important exception, Stuenkel and Taylor, eds., Brazil on the Global Stage. 
15 Brazil is often grouped with other emerging powers. See Andrew Hurrell, ‘Hegemony, Liberalism and Global 
Order: What Space for Would‐ be Great Powers?’, International Affairs 82: 1, January 2006, pp. 1–19; Kristen 
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Latin America in the LIO canon 
Latin America is conspicuous in its absence in the canonical works on LIO, which typically 
see the order as positive sum, if not universally benign. The term ‘liberal international order’ 
is perhaps most associated with Princeton Professor G. John Ikenberry. For Ikenberry, despite 
variations over time, the LIO can be understood as a relatively open and rules-based form of 
organizing international politics.16 In discussing LIO’s evolution, canonical works argue that 
today’s LIO was layered over previous international orders—the Westphalian system of 
sovereign states, British liberal internationalism, and Wilsonianism—and retains some of 
their characteristics.17 (Less acknowledged is that this order was also layered over early 
international law that emerged from the Iberian conquest of the Americas.18) Intellectually, 
Ikenberry and his collaborators undertake another form of layering, adding liberal 
institutional and ideational content to adaptations of hegemonic stability theory that 
emphasize the centrality of a major power.19 Liberal authors, however, have seen 
international multilateral institutions as potentially self-sustaining, given the efficiencies and 
benefits they create, and the shared liberal democratic norms of core states.20 
Deudney and Ikenberry argue that the post-WWII, US-led variant of LIO is marked by five 
features: co-binding security institutions that limited US unilateral power, penetrated US 
hegemony that permitted consultation in US decisions, semi-sovereign great powers 
Germany and Japan that foreswore military might, economic openness through multilateral 
                                                          
Hopewell, ‘The BRICS—merely a fable? Emerging power alliances in global trade governance’, International 
Affairs 93: 6, November 2017, pp. 1377–96. For more direct discussions of Brazil in this light, see Stuenkel and 
Taylor, eds., Brazil on the global stage; David R. Mares and Harold A. Trinkunas, Aspirational power: Brazil 
on the long road to global influence (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2016); Sean W. Burges, 
Brazil in the world: the international relations of a South American giant (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2017). Literature on Brazil as a regional leader has discussed LIO less directly. See, Andrés Malamud, ‘A 
leader without followers? The growing divergence between the regional and global performance of Brazilian 
foreign policy’, Latin American Politics and Society 53: 3, Fall 2011, pp. 1–24; Maria Regina Soares de Lima 
and Mônica Hirst, ‘Brazil as an intermediate state and regional power: action, choice and responsibilities’, 
International Affairs 82: 1, January 2006, pp. 21–40. 
16 Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan; G John Ikenberry, ‘The end of liberal international order?’, International 
Affairs 94: 1, January 2018, pp. 7–23. 
17 In addition, see Charles A. Kupchan and Peter L. Trubowitz, ‘Dead center: the demise of liberal 
internationalism in the United States’, International Security 32: 2, Fall 2007, pp. 10–20. 
18 Annabel S. Brett, Changes of state: nature and the limits of the city in early modern natural law 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011). 
19 Robert Gilpin, War and change in world politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Charles A. 
Kupchan, ‘After pax americana: benign power, regional integration, and the sources of a stable multipolarity’, 
International Security 23: 2, Fall 1998, pp. 40–79.  
20 Robert O. Keohane, After hegemony: cooperation and discord in the world political economy (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1984); Charles Lipson, Reliable partners: how democracies have made a separate 
peace (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003) 
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trade institutions, and shared civic identities based in liberal democratic values.21 Though 
Ikenberry and his collaborators reach optimistic conclusions about LIO’s benefits for 
economic growth and international stability, they recognize that the order is inherently 
presaged on international inequalities that grant the United States a dominant role to maintain 
the system. Some of LIO’s hierarchical international relationships are largely negotiated; 
others resemble patron-client relationships or are coercive.  
Many, and perhaps all, of the five characteristics that Deudney and Ikenberry ascribe to LIO 
could be relevant to Latin America’s engagement with the United States and wider world. 
However, the region is largely hidden in ‘the shadow that hegemonic nations cast’, to use the 
words of Ikenberry and Kupchan.22 Ikenberry spends significant time in Liberal Leviathan 
comparing multilateral US strategies in postwar Europe with bilateral approaches to East 
Asia.23 He mentions that US policies in Latin America were at times ‘crudely imperial’. 
Similar phrases recur in his work, which has not deeply explored Latin America’s role in LIO 
or LIO’s effects on Latin America. Again, this absence is not uncommon. For example, 
Sorensen’s book on the origins and crisis of LIO only mentions the region briefly, largely in 
terms of its democratization and uneven experiences with market transitions, but it is 
tangential to his account of LIO’s rise or of its more recent crises.24 The gap reflects relative 
inattention to non-great powers’ roles in shaping LIO. Latin America’s lack of great powers 
and the often-overstated presumption of US domination have led this scholarship to overlook 
the region’s contributions to and engagement with LIO. 
As we suggest below, studying the Latin American experience challenges aspects of these 
accounts, while providing empirics to develop undertheorized aspects of LIO. Most accounts 
of LIO leave the actual bargains between the United States and weaker states unexplored, 
variously suggesting mechanisms of socialization, use of market power, imposition, and pay 
offs. Most explicitly, Lake sees weaker states as ‘subordinates’ who support a relationship 
based in legitimate authority; subordinates’ support is in fact key to the maintenance of 
                                                          
21 Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, ‘The nature and sources of liberal international order’, Review of 
International Studies 25: 2, April 1999, pp. 179–96. 
22 G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, ‘Socialization and hegemonic power’, International Organization 
44: 3, Summer 1990, pp. 283-315 
23 Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan, pp. 26–27, 90–91, 99–102, 149–50, 183–90.  
24 Georg Sorensen, A liberal world order in crisis: choosing between imposition and restraint (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2011). 
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order.25 Latin American acquiescence is often taken for granted. This contrasts with emerging 
historical scholarship on Latin American agency in inter-American relations.26 If these 
asymmetrical bargains are fundamental to the working of liberal hegemonic leadership,27 they 
should be explored in greater depth. The nature of these bargains raises questions about the 
benefits of LIO: do these relationships create widely shared gains or are they narrow pacts 
with elites, perhaps to the detriment of populations? While inequality has emerged, even 
among supporters, as a central challenge in the LIO’s core states,28 these issues have a longer 
and often troubling heritage in Latin America. 
Latin America in critical accounts 
In the eyes of its harshest critics, LIO is little more than a facade, and an intellectual 
justification, for Western and US dominance over the poor and weak. For these critics, often 
situated in post-colonial theory, imposition and coercion are more marked characteristics of 
LIO than negotiation and restraint. Parmar, Jahn and others argue that liberal 
internationalism, and much LIO scholarship, serves to legitimate and naturalize, not to 
explain, certain international policies. ‘The key point is that the LIO is a class-based, elitist 
hegemony—strongly imbued with explicit and implicit racial and colonial/imperial 
assumptions’.29 Critics see liberal politics as ineffective in developing country contexts, and 
often hypocritical. Jahn argues that ‘liberal foreign policies frequently failed to achieve their 
goals and that liberal actors often failed to act in accordance with liberal principles’.30 This 
vision of the world has ‘special rules’ for the West and ‘cuts off the rest of the world’.31 In 
describing LIO’s origins, critical accounts highlight colonialism’s role in the development of 
today’s international system. Jahn argues that ‘The establishment of liberalism thus required 
                                                          
25 David A. Lake, ‘American hegemony and the future of East-West relations’, International Studies 
Perspectives 7: 1, February 2006, pp. 23–30; David A Lake, Hierarchy in International Relations (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2009). 
26 Tom Long, Latin America confronts the United States: asymmetry and influence (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015); Christopher Darnton, ‘After decentering: the politics of agency and hegemony in 
hemispheric relations’, Latin American Research Review 48: 3, 2013, pp. 231–39; Tanya Harmer, Allende’s 
Chile and the inter-American Cold War (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2014); Hal Brands, Latin America’s Cold 
War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010); Max Paul Friedman, ‘Retiring the puppets, bringing 
Latin America back in: recent scholarship on United States-Latin American relations’, Diplomatic History 27: 5, 
2003, pp. 621–36. 
27 Brantly Womack, Asymmetry and International Relationships (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2016), pp. 5-7.  
28 Carla Norrlof, ‘Hegemony and inequality: Trump and the liberal playbook’, International Affairs 94: 1, 
January 2018, pp. 63–88; Jeff D. Colgan and Robert O. Keohane, ‘The liberal order is rigged: fix it now or 
watch it wither’, Foreign Affairs 96, May/June 2017, p. 36. 
29 Parmar, ‘The US-led liberal order’, p. 152. See also Beate Jahn, ‘Liberal internationalism: from ideology to 
empirical theory–and back again’, International Theory 1: 3, November 2009, pp. 409–38. 
30 Beate Jahn, Liberal internationalism: theory, history, practice (Springer, 2013), pp. 3–4. 
31 Parmar, ‘The US-led liberal order’, p. 157. 
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policies of colonialism’.32 Recent leading critical histories of the League of Nations and the 
creation of the United Nations emphasize race and empire, but do not discuss the Latin 
American role, despite the region’s numerical weight both in Geneva and at the 1945 San 
Francisco conference.33 Critics argue that LIO is inextricably linked to hierarchies not just 
between states, as Ikenberry agrees, but of class, race, and empire. Parmar argues that 
‘background ideas’ of race and empire underpinned foundational moments of liberal order 
and implicitly guide its institutions and policies today.34 This limits LIO’s ability to 
incorporate non-Western powers.  
Given dominant critical currents in the scholarship on US foreign policy towards Latin 
America, which emphasize the role of economic interests and racial prejudice in shaping US 
policy,35 one might expect the region to be a central case for critical accounts of LIO. 
However, Latin America has not featured prominently. For example, the region is barely 
mentioned in Pankaj Mishra’s popular critiques of LIO (and when it is, in Age of Anger, it is 
always grouped with Africa and Asia).36 Latin America’s minimal role owes, perhaps, to the 
countries’ largely sovereign status throughout the development of LIO. Latin America’s 
international political status has long been ambiguous: ‘Indeed the region has often been seen 
as a kind of international middle class, occupying an intermediate position between First and 
Third Worlds’.37 Many critiques of LIO are focused on its philosophical bases, its ties with 
colonialism, the failures of its policy interventions, or its limited and elitist nature. Latin 
America may be less immediately relevant to formal colonialism, but it would seem to 
connect deeply with concerns about the role of elites—an area of emphasis for the region’s 
historically oriented dependency theorists.38 The lack of attention to Latin America in 
critiques of LIO mirrors the disconnect, noted by Kapoor, between Latin America’s tradition 
                                                          
32 Jahn, ‘Liberal internationalism: historical trajectory and current prospects’, p. 50.  
33 Susan Pedersen, The guardians: the League of Nations and the crisis of empire (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2015); Mark Mazower, No enchanted palace: the end of empire and the ideological origins of the United 
Nations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009). 
34 Inderjeet Parmar, ‘Racial and imperial thinking in international theory and politics: Truman, Attlee and the 
Korean War’, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 18, no. 2 (2016), pp. 351–69. 
35 Lars Schoultz, Beneath the United States: a history of US policy toward Latin America (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1998).  
36 See Pankaj Mishra, Age of Anger: A History of the Present (London: Allen Lane, 2017). 
37 Andrew Hurrell, ‘Latin America and the West’, in Robert O’Neill and R.J. Vincent, eds., The West and the 
Third World (London: Palgrave, 1990), pp. 153–69. 
38 For a summary of dependency theory’s development, see Joseph L. Love, ‘The origins of dependency 
analysis’, Journal of Latin American Studies 22: 1-2, February 1990, pp. 143-168. The classic text is Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Falleto, Dependency and development in Latin America (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1979 [1971]). For a critical perspective connecting Latin America to world-capitalist systems, 
see William I. Robinson, Latin America and global capitalism: A critical globalization perspective. (Baltimore: 
JHU Press, 2008). 
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of economically oriented dependency theory and today’s more influential, cultural strands of 
post-colonial IR theory.39 However, because these bargains were struck with (or imposed on) 
the leaders of legally sovereign states, they may tell us more about the interaction of weak 
states with LIO today. These relationships are emphasized by the idea of ‘international 
insertion,’ common in Latin American IR but usually marginal in dominant, English-
language debates on LIO.40  
LIO, Latin America, and regional orders 
Of works that engage directly with LIO, Latin America has been most represented in those 
that emphasize the regionalization of international order. However, the relationship between 
regions and LIO is somewhat ambiguous. Proponents of liberal economic multilateralism 
tend to see regionalism as undermining global trade gains.41 From an IR perspective, these 
discussions focus on whether regions are likely to promote stability or act as competing 
blocs. For Katzenstein, regions are not especially autonomous from the broader, US-led 
global structures.42 Much of the regionalist literature has a contemporary bent. Acharya sees 
regionalism as a response to US relative decline. Drawing on examples of non-western 
contributions to the construction of international order, Acharya has argued that the US-led 
LIO is likely to contract, that it is being replaced by open and connected regional orders 
normatively shaped by local actors, and that these are generally positive developments.43 
Hurrell, emerging from a ‘society of states’ tradition, is skeptical of what he calls liberal 
solidarist international society. Latin Americans historically emphasized a ‘traditional 
pluralist conception’ of global order. This shifted during the 1990s, when, ‘Outside Europe, 
the Americas provide the clearest example of the move towards a regional liberal solidarism’. 
For a decade, Latin American states were active promoters of economic integration and 
democratic solidarity at the regional level. Issues once considered purely internal—regime 
type, human rights, organized crime—became the core of the inter-American agenda with the 
                                                          
39 Ilan Kapoor, The postcolonial politics of development (London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 3-18. 
40 See Tickner, ‘Hearing Latin America voices’.  
41 Jagdish Bhagwati, ‘Regionalism and Multilateralism: An Overview’, in Jaime de Mello and Arvind 
Panagariya, eds., New Dimensions in Regional Integration, 1993, pp. 22-51. 
42 Peter J. Katzenstein, A world of regions: Asia and Europe in the American imperium (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2005). 
43 Amitav Acharya, ‘Norm subsidiarity and regional orders: sovereignty, regionalism, and rule‐ making in the 
Third World’, International Studies Quarterly 55: 1, March 2011, pp. 95–123; Acharya, ‘The emerging regional 
architecture of world politics’, World Politics 59: 4, July 2007, pp. 629–52. 
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support of most of the region’s leaders. A temporary reduction in the region’s left-right 
tensions seemed to produce a Latin American consensus for deeper integration with LIO.44  
The ambiguity regarding the relationship between regional orders and global LIO increases in 
the case of Latin America. Acharya argues that regional orders will remain open and 
integrated under a looser global framework.45 During the early 2000s, South America 
upgraded regional organizations and sought to diminish US influence through closer ties with 
a rising China; at the same time, much of Central America, Mexico, and the Caribbean 
became more deeply integrated with the United States through production chains and 
migration networks. Multifacted regionalism in Latin America has long co-existed with deep 
US engagement.46 But will a retrenching United States seek to reestablish a traditional sphere 
of influence over Latin America, or will Latin America press for regional autonomy? What 
do these countervailing trends mean for the sorts of bargains that Ikenberry describes 
between leading and secondary states? Through a critical lens, how does the region’s 
historical experience with US interventionism—in which regionalism was often used 
defensively but without deep commitments—mean for its future?  
Latin America and LIO: A brief history 
What can Latin America tell us about LIO, and what can LIO contribute to our understanding 
of Latin American countries’ international roles and domestic development? For authors 
generally supportive of LIO, the order’s failure to take deeper root in seemingly hospitable 
ground may offer puzzling cases or insights into how to integrate states beyond LIO’s North 
Atlantic core. For critics focused on the illiberalism of the liberal order, Latin America 
presents a different mix of exclusion and inclusion in aspects of international political and 
economic order from more recently postcolonial states. Latin American states and LIO 
evolved together in many respects. Historically, some Latin American elites strove to more 
fully join LIO’s society of states, structures of open trade, global institutions, democratic 
practice—though they were often counterbalanced by conservative or nationalist forces 
within their own societies. Even when Latin American liberals had the upper hand at home, 
they were not always welcomed into Eurocentric international society on equal terms.47  
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Instead, Latin America often found itself on the margins of LIO—but not without some 
influence. It shaped expansive, if thin, regional international institutions during the early 20th 
century.48 The region developed important works on international law, though these were 
often defensive in content.49 The progress of democracy was uneven, and regional 
international economic insertion was characterized by great fluctuations in models and 
performance.50 While some authors interpret this as an absence of agency,51 one can instead 
treat Latin American agency as present but conditioned by domestic forces and international 
power asymmetry.52 Both critics and proponents of LIO agree that asymmetries are central to 
the system’s creation and operation. Latin America offers an important locale to more 
thoroughly examine peripheral states’ engagement with asymmetrical international orders—
to the detriment of their societies, some might argue—and to grapple with international 
order’s effects on processes of state formation and economic development. 
The following historical sketch outlines potential insights into LIO from Latin American 
experiences. This focuses on Latin America’s relation to LIO’s critical junctures and on how 
we might understand the region’s international position in this context. During two centuries 
of Latin American independence, leaders have adopted, adapted, rejected, and embraced 
aspects of liberal international ideas and practices on politics and economics, even as their 
countries were often left at the margins of the emerging, partly liberal, community of states.  
Independence and British LIO 
There has been little attention to the role of Latin America in emergence of the first variant of 
LIO: the British-led expansion of open trade, the gold standard, and freedom of the seas.53 
Most states in Latin America achieved political independence by the mid-1820s and evolved 
alongside British-led order; imperial arrangements, liberalism, and other ideas shaped new 
and inchoate forms of sovereignty that emerged in the region.54 Latin American states were 
not, for the most part, colonized as part of the order’s extension. However, British investment 
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and trade with Latin America was expansive during the period and affected elite and state 
formation. As the 20th century unfolded, the Western Hemisphere was the crucial site of 
commercial and strategic competition and accommodation between the US and Britain.55 
New Latin American states may not have been ‘rule makers’ in the British international 
order; however, an important segment of Latin American elites actively favored Britain as a 
bulwark against Spanish efforts at reconquest and because liberal ideas aligned with their 
republican views and opposition to trade restrictions.56 Liberal economic thought, including 
that of key British thinkers, was widely known and debated in the region throughout the 19th 
century.57 Liberal philosophy influenced a period of export-oriented commercial policy in 
Latin America, though liberals struggled to wean governments from reliance on tariff 
revenues and nationalist economic policies also had many adherents.  
More generally, political liberalism was unevenly embraced both within Latin American 
societies and in the emerging liberal powers’ views of Latin Americans. Liberalism at home 
remained a contentious question throughout the period of British-led LIO, provoking conflict 
in many countries between liberals and conservatives, who favored rigid social hierarchies 
and a central role for the Catholic Church (in contrast to the Protestant Anglo-American 
powers).58 Grandin argues that Latin Americans developed distinct notions of the relationship 
between individual rights and sovereignty from the US and Britain.59 Even this distinct 
liberalism was far from universal. In Brazil, liberalism was juxtaposed first with monarchy 
and slaveholding and later with military authoritarianism and centralized developmentalism.60 
Mexican liberal President Benito Juárez favored close ties with the United States in 
opposition to conservatives who sought to—and briefly did—re-establish European 
monarchy.61 The United States, of course, also experienced deep and deadly divisions on 
these issues but, after its own civil war, claimed a leading international role in a way that 
Latin American states could not. Even liberal Latin Americans were not accorded full 
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participation in the European society of states. Latin American diplomats frequently argued 
for inclusion under the standard of civilization, which created an international legal hierarchy, 
rather than rejecting the standard’s legitimacy.62 Despite that, they often found themselves 
relegated to secondary or marginal positions, in inter-American relations, at the Hague in 
1907, and then in the League of Nations. 
During this period, Latin America seems to fall into the gap between attention to great power 
interactions (the US-British power transition) and those powers’ colonial and imperial 
practices. Latin American countries are either the battlefield, prize, or victim of frequent great 
power intervention, but rarely international actors in their own right. If we are to understand 
the effects of LIO on sovereign but relatively weak states—a central contemporary issue—
this is a major oversight. How did these dynamics affect the early version of LIO? How did 
this early LIO affect Latin America’s development, including elite composition and definition 
of national interests? From the perspective of the LIO debate, or at least its major English-
language currents, these questions remain largely unexplored. 
US-led LIO’s founding moments 
Most accounts of the origins of US-led LIO emphasize two key figures: Woodrow Wilson 
and Franklin Delano Roosevelt. These narratives, particularly those of more supportive 
scholars, tend to emphasize the policymakers’ interactions with Europe and, in the case of 
FDR, Asia. Critical accounts have focused on these figures’ continuation of imperial/colonial 
relationships and the race, class, and gender biases in founding moments. Latin America’s 
relative absence is a particular oversight because US-Latin American relations were 
fundamental to both presidents’ foreign policy evolutions and worldviews. 
Wilson serves both as a pivotal historical figure and a liberal/colonial archetype. Best known 
for the Fourteen Points and his advocacy of international organization, critical accounts point 
out that Wilson’s record was notoriously retrograde on ‘the race question’, including keeping 
African American men out of Princeton and then pushing them to the corners of federal 
employment.63 Racial paternalism, both Wilson’s and that of his European counterparts, 
marked the post-WWI international system as well. This occurred most notably through the 
League of Nations Mandate System, which denied Africans, Asians, Arabs, and Pacific 
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islanders the right to self-rule based on assumptions that they were incapable of governance 
without ‘civilized’ tutelage.64 Parmar argues that ‘Wilson’s conviction that US intervention in 
world affairs was essential’ to the early development of LIO after WWI.65 Ikenberry has 
recognized this point, agreeing that, ‘The liberal internationalism of the Woodrow Wilson era 
was built around civilizational, racial and cultural hierarchies. It was a creature of the western 
white man’s world’.66  
To what extent did this system also reflect Wilson’s earlier experiences of ‘teaching’ Latin 
Americans about good governance? One account of Wilson’s liberal internationalism notes 
that ‘the president began to develop the idea of collective security in the Western 
Hemisphere’ and saw postwar plans as ‘the extension of Wilson’s Latin American policy’.67 
Wilson’s designs in both hemispheres were marked by crusading notions of paternalistic 
progressivism and ‘uplift’, with limitations on national self-determination and democratic 
governance. US policymakers’ racial contexts and prejudices also shaped policy toward Latin 
America in the decades before the Great War.68 Wilson himself ordered multiple military 
interventions in the region and infamously defended an intervention in Mexico with the goal 
of ‘teaching the South American republics to elect good men’.69 Wilson’s interventions were 
justified by democratic and progressive ideals, but were equally marked by racial 
paternalism, notably in the long, brutal occupation of Haiti.70 Latin Americans decried the 
contrast between Wilson’s rhetorical embrace of self-determination and US occupations that 
denied that right to Haitians and Dominicans; they would later attempt to use Wilson’s own 
League of Nations to limit US unilateralism.71 
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However, the paternalistic progressivism of Wilson’s interventions in Latin America differed 
from the Mandate System in important ways: these occupations violated the nominal 
sovereignty of the intervened. Most Mandates had never been recognized as possessing 
juridical international sovereignty. Some US interventions eschewed this problem, with the 
Marines arriving at the invitation of an at-least-nominally governing party (as in the 
Nicaraguan intervention). This was certainly not the case in Mexico, where Wilson 
intervened militarily twice. The violation of sovereignty provided a rallying cry for many 
other Latin Americans who responded in part through international legal innovation.  
US experience with international law and burgeoning, Pan American international 
organization informed its international projects.72 These practices, formed in the Americas—
and not just by US fiat—clearly affected the Wilsonian international project of 1919. Grandin 
argues that ‘Based on principles of non-aggression, international arbitration, and economic 
justice, [Latin Americans] developed a sovereignty–social rights complex…that would 
revolutionize the interstate system’.73 Latin American legal practices of uti possidetis and Pan 
American conferences shaped US plans for the League, Grandin notes. More generally, Latin 
America shaped US international behaviours in the hemisphere and globally.74 The overlaps 
were often quite concrete, as in the case of the League covenant. Parmar notes the role of the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in shaping Wilson’s international designs; the 
same organization supported the development of international law in the Americas.75   
In many respects, the First World War brought Latin America more deeply into the ‘global’ 
than ever before.76 The US shirked the global postwar system its president had helped design, 
but Latin America largely embraced it. The League of Nations and new International Labour 
Organisation offered opportunities to bolster multilateralism and gain greater access to 
international society, while shaping developments in technical cooperation, labour rights, and 
arbitration.77 This was not an entirely smooth experience; Brazil quit the organization in 
disgust when defeated Germany was granted a permanent seat while its own aspirations were 
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ignored.78 Other Latin American states also had tense relations and at times shunned the 
League, but there were important successes, too.79 More attention to Latin America’s role in 
the interwar period would add nuance to a period often examined largely as the failure of 
LIO. For example, Helleiner has shown how ideas that shaped Bretton Woods emerged from 
inter-American policies during this time.80  
Moving forward, Latin American diplomats were significant actors in the creation of the 
post-WWII system, translating their numerical weight and diplomatic skill into influence, 
particularly in the preservation of regional systems and the creation of social, cultural, and 
economic components.81 Having been promised a rejuvenated, more multilateral inter-
American system in the 1945 Chapultepec Conference, Latin Americans defended that goal 
at the United Nations conference at San Francisco. Their threat of a walkout led the great 
powers to shift positions and make space for regional systems under UN Charter Article 51.82 
Latin Americans also shaped the development content of Bretton Woods institutions during 
this time.83 Concepts of human rights advanced by Latin American jurists, and previously 
developed in the Western Hemisphere, greatly influenced the 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights.84 Latin American ideas of democracy promotion, including nonrecognition of 
coup governments, have roots dating at least to the 1907 Tovar Doctrine. They gained new 
life in the immediate post-WWII period, though the willingness to put pro-democracy norms 
into practice was often limited. Uruguay’s 1945-46 Larreta Doctrine on collective 
intervention in defense of democracy failed against Latin American opposition, as did the 
later Venezuelan Betancourt Doctrine. Military authoritarians and dubious democrats have 
shielded one another’s abuses behind the rhetoric of sovereignty and nonintervention.85 Even 
when the US pushed for democratization, intransigent dictators often resisted those 
pressures.86 Still, the flame of Latin American support for democratic governance and human 
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and social rights endured. Civil society and regional juridical practices against human rights 
abuses in the 1970s and 1980s reshaped global discourses and policies.87 These episodes 
support Acharya’s view that the LIO was not only made in the USA; Latin American and 
others’ contributions ‘helped to localize and strengthen’ international order.88 However, these 
contributions have rarely been examined in depth in the context of the LIO debate to gain a 
better understanding of that order. Instead, secondary powers and minor states are seen as 
accepting bargains for their benefits or suffering as victims, but rarely as shaping central 
aspects of LIO’s formation. In practice, liberals, radicals, and reactionaries in Latin America 
all jousted with Washington to shape the rules and their application. 
Attention to the interwar period, and to the influence of the Good Neighbor Policy on 
evolving US and Latin American views of international order would not just uncover the 
‘forgotten foundations’ of other US policies, it would help show how those have been shaped 
from the margins—sometimes through explicit attempts to constraint US unilateralism.89 
These contributions merit inclusion; however, their relative absence reflects the ensuing 
marginalization of Latin America from the order that its diplomats supported and shaped in 
Bretton Woods and San Francisco. 
Cold War 
While Latin Americans shaped the institutions of the post-WWII order in their region and 
globally, the concrete benefits of LIO fell short of their expectations, particularly in terms of 
material support for economic development. Many Latin American liberals, whose influence 
had risen from 1944-47,90 were sidelined as anticommunism trumped democracy in US and 
LIO priorities.91 Though the origins of US-European and US-Asian postwar relations have 
received extensive attention, the reborn inter-American system plays little role in these IR 
debates.92 
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During the Cold War, Latin America was part zone of contestation and part second-class 
member of what Ikenberry calls the Western order inside the world system. Initially, the 
United States counted on—and largely received—Latin American backing in international 
organizations, particularly in the UN General Assembly. This began to change as Latin 
American diplomats used the inter-American system to extract greater concessions in 
exchange for anticommunism.93 Of course, US-Latin American relationships were not always 
negotiated, and even then, not as equals. Examples of US coercion, often in the name of 
preserving liberal (anti-communist) international order are myriad: covert operations in 
Guatemala in 1954, Guyana in the early 1960s, in Cuba for decades, in Chile in the early 
1970s, and in Central America during the 1980s. Invasions of the Dominican Republic in 
1965 and Grenada in 1983 were only the most obvious instances in which the US presumed 
for itself an exception to LIO’s rules.94 In other cases, the United States tolerated or directly 
supported illiberal rulers who maintained stability and diplomatic support in Latin America 
and elsewhere.95 
Latin America’s role in the Cold War has not been a major part of the discussion of LIO. For 
critics, US interventions in the region might be proof that imposition and violence are the 
core of LIO—Exhibit A of the imperial nature of US policy. Ikenberry, too, categorizes US 
relationships with Latin America as ‘crudely imperial’. However, recent historical 
scholarship has demonstrated the importance of Latin American agency during the Cold War; 
better understanding these complex relationships would add nuance to LIO’s accounts of the 
period. Mexico delicately managed relations with the United States and Fidel Castro’s Cuba 
to burnish its regime’s fading revolutionary credentials without jeopardizing economic 
growth.96 In their ‘quest for autonomy,’ Brazil’s generals maintained a certain distance from 
the US despite shared anti-communism. At times they were ahead of the United States in 
repressing the region’s left; at others, their developmentalist policies conflicted with 
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Washington’s goals.97 In a more positive light, even partial inclusion in the LIO facilitated 
the region’s emergence as a nuclear-weapons-free zone and contributed to the relative 
absence of Latin American interstate militarized conflicts since World War II, though internal 
conflicts and US interventions could be as destabilizing and devastating.98 In practice, Latin 
American support or contestation of US policies varied widely. Scholarship on Latin 
America’s Cold War emphasizes overlapping local, regional, and national dimensions of 
conflicts. However, the international dimension has largely been considered in terms of US-
Soviet bipolarity. A more complete picture would consider how LIO shaped Latin American 
preferences and choices. Globally, the emergence of new states through decolonization 
provided diplomatic partners for Latin Americans to challenge the US. However, liberal 
internationalism remained influential in Latin America’s Cold War, with struggles for 
democracy and multilateralism at local, regional, and global levels. International institutions 
were sites not just of hegemonic coercion but of resistance and willing cooperation. This 
included US-backed regional IOs and subregional organizations that diluted or mediated US 
influence. A fuller picture of LIO during the Cold War requires a better understanding of how 
it operated in Latin America and how Latin American states engaged with, accepted, 
challenged, revised, or influenced LIO. This stretches from the founding moments, at which 
Latin Americans were not only present but active, through the middle of the Cold War when 
democracy barely survived in the region, to the resuscitation of liberal regional traditions 
during the 1980s amid repression and bloodletting.  
Liberal at last? 
When the liberal order expanded at the end of the Cold War, it seemed that Latin America’s 
full membership might be at hand. Starting in the mid-1980s, the region embraced LIO’s 
tenets as readily as anywhere in the world. Elections spread, while economic barriers fell. 
Regional commitments to democracy were made and strengthened. Ambitious plans for 
subregional and hemispheric trade were advanced, often with enthusiastic cooperation with 
the US. Many Latin American states expanded their involvement with UN peacekeeping, 
global environmental governance, and global trade regimes. 
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However, this engagement often provoked greater disappointment. The order’s reach was 
broad, but not deep. De jure democracy was supported; in some cases, regional commitments 
helped turn back threats to democratic rule. However, regional democratic norms were 
applied unevenly and rarely against incumbents, sapping the instruments of legitimacy.99 In 
many more countries, weak state capacity undermined the gains from democratic governance. 
Liberalization, which had emerged largely in response to debt and economic crises, was 
broadly perceived as having exacerbated inequalities. Ikenberry argues that LIO’s crisis in 
core states results from the decline of ‘embedded liberalism’ and rise of neoliberalism, which 
reduced state capacities to cushion global economic fluctuations. This dynamic was more 
pernicious and came earlier in Latin America, long marked by high inequality and little elite 
propensity to support redistributive taxation.100 Privatization helped balance the budgets of 
heavily indebted governments but also limited their ability to respond to dislocation and 
discontent. International and constitutional commitments to social guarantees—Grandin’s 
‘sovereignty-social rights complex’—often remained paper thin. Meanwhile, the explosion of 
global connections facilitated transnational corruption and illicit trade alongside legal 
exchanges. Burgeoning, illicit nonstate actors benefitted from the underbelly of LIO-inspired 
globalization, in which products and funds were easier to move than ever, but where the lack 
of a legal framework meant that markets were opaque and disputes were settled with 
violence. Not all these problems can or should be blamed on LIO, nor should they be 
disconnected from domestic causes. However, in many of these issues, international drivers 
are central. Post-Cold War democracy promotion, engagement with international financial 
institutions, and evolving patterns of trade are deeply connected, and profoundly rooted 
historically, in the region’s uneven engagement with LIO. 
Discontent set the stage for two important shifts, both with ambiguous effects for Latin 
America’s engagement with LIO. The first was the emergence of the ‘new left’ or ‘pink tide’ 
in the region. There is nothing necessarily anti-LIO about a turn to the left—the post-WWII 
refoundation emerged in the context of the US New Deal and brief opening for the Latin 
American democratic left. However, many new left leaders rejected both US leadership and 
participation in LIO at a time when Washington itself was trampling international norms in 
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the name of the War of Terror. Liberal regional commitments on democracy, human rights, 
and trade waned, while enthusiasm grew for the creation of subregional orders with varying 
commitments to liberal norms.101 The second shift was the ‘rise of the rest’, namely China. 
Together, these trends opened space for greater Latin American participation in South-South 
diplomatic efforts, with Brazil often leading the way.102 To an extent, this brought Latin 
America (or at least Brazil) into the debate about whether rising powers will make the LIO 
less liberal and less orderly.103 With a hint of déjà vu, these discussions often emphasize US-
Chinese competition and depict the region as a zone of great power rivalry. There is 
tremendous diversity in Latin American responses to this conjuncture, in which Latin 
American liberals must also grapple with the inconsistency of LIO’s central players.  
Conclusions  
Latin America has been marginal in the study of the origins and operations, causes and 
consequences, of liberal international order. There is much to learn from the region’s 
evolution alongside LIO, its longstanding contributions to the international law, norms, and 
institutions that form LIO’s core, and its experience of partial inclusion in an asymmetrical 
order. Studying Latin American engagement with LIO would provide a more robust 
understanding of the role of secondary powers and small states in the order’s creation and 
continuation. We have sketched these gaps above, but much work remains to be done.  
As IR increasingly recognizes the need to incorporate non-US and non-European 
perspectives to become a truly global field,104 the literature on LIO would benefit from 
engagement with concepts and theories emerging from Latin American scholarship—only 
briefly signalled here. How do the negotiated bargains of hierarchy, as seen by scholars like 
Ikenberry and Lake, square with concepts like autonomy and international insertion more 
often emphasized by Latin American IR?105 The debate over whether to join hegemonic 
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hierarchies or prioritize principles is surely relevant to understanding the choices of 
secondary states.106 Latin America has the longest sovereign history of facing this choice 
from the margins of international order, liberal or otherwise. These choices look very 
different depending on geostrategic and economic position, even within Latin America. The 
region’s diversity offers a wide variety of perspectives, contexts, and empirical variation. 
Including Latin America in the study of the LIO offers much more than a new set of cases; it 
should provoke a greater rethinking of the relationships at the core of that order, as well as 
the theory and concepts we use to explain them. 
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